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INTRODUCTION 
gain and again, renewable energy enthusiasts pose the same 
perplexing question: Why is it so difficult to generate more of 
our nation’s electricity from clean, renewable resources, and how do 
we make it happen? The short answer is that the Federal Power Act 
reserves federal authority over wholesale sales of electricity, which 
preempts states from setting the wholesale price for electricity 
generated from renewable resources. As a result, states are limited in 
their ability to make electricity generated from renewable resources 
profitable. All is not lost, however, as federal legislation and federal 
administrative orders continue to chip away at the preemption 
obstacle of the Federal Power Act. This Comment examines the major 
federal laws governing the electricity industry in the United States 
and proposes a creative legal solution that allows green-minded states 
to bring more electricity generated from renewable resources onto the 
grid at a price that is fair to renewable generators. 
Part I presents the legal obstacles states face when trying to 
encourage the addition of renewables to the electrical grid by 
explaining the foundational laws and concepts that affect renewable 
energy law, including the Federal Power Act (FPA), wholesale versus 
retail sales of electricity, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
(PURPA), and a utility’s avoided cost rate. Additionally, the adverse 
effects of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), which 
amended PURPA to exempt certain utilities from their purchase 
obligation from qualifying facilities (QF), are discussed. Part II 
presents the advantages and disadvantages of the different options 
available to renewable generators to sell their electricity, namely by 
obtaining QF status or by gaining market-based rate authority. Part III 
evaluates two Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
Orders that interpret PURPA in a way favorable to state action on 
renewables by authorizing feed-in tariffs within the bounds of 
PURPA. Most importantly, this Comment’s recount of the 
progression of energy law in the United States from the early 1900s to 
today will enable the reader to understand and recognize the tools 
now available to states, which, if properly exercised, could ensure that 
A
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the electricity we use today, and in the future, comes from clean, 
renewable resources. 
I 
A CHRONOLOGICAL LOOK AT FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
One of the primary reasons it is so difficult for states to require 
increased electricity generation from renewable sources is because a 
state’s authority over electricity is preempted by federal law, through 
the Federal Power Act (FPA), in important ways. Although the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) and state-
empowering orders by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) have reduced the preemption problem, a state still lacks the 
crucial ability to set the rate that a renewable generator will be paid 
for its electricity. It is important that states have this power because 
federal-level action on renewable energy is severely lacking. 
However, state-level experimentation in renewable energy policy and 
energy efficiency is robust and has been for years. In fact, twenty-
nine states currently have Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) that 
are legally-binding mandates requiring utilities to purchase certain 
percentages or amounts of electricity from renewable resources.1 In 
contrast, although it may sound absurd, the United States still does 
not have a federal renewable energy policy in place,2 nor has it ever 
had a truly comprehensive energy plan.3 Thus, in order for states to 
take meaningful steps toward increasing renewable energy generation, 
the preemption issue must be addressed. Thankfully, as this Comment 
explains, federal preemption of state authority over wholesale 
electricity sales is becoming less of an obstacle for state action on 
renewable energy. 
	
1 Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), Renewable 
Portfolio Standard Policies (Mar. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/ 
summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf. 
2 Energy in Brief: What are Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) and How do They 
Affect Renewable Electricity Generation?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia 
.gov/energy_in_brief/article/renewable_portfolio_standards.cfm (last updated Jan. 25, 
2013). 
3 JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 66 (2d ed. 
2011). President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, issued on June 25, 2013, is a step in the 
right direction toward establishing a comprehensive energy plan in the United States. 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimate 
actionplan.pdf. 
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A. The Federal Power Act and Wholesale Sales of Electricity 
The FPA creates an obstacle for state authority over renewable 
energy generation because it prohibits states from setting the rates for 
wholesale sales of electricity.4 Congress passed Part II of the FPA in 
1935, explicitly giving the federal government the power to regulate 
“the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”5 A 
wholesale sale of electricity is “a sale of electric energy to any person 
for resale,”6 the key word being “resale.” The foundational point to 
grasp is that the federal government, through FERC,7 has sole 
authority over wholesale sales of electricity. One example of a 
wholesale sale is when an electricity generator sells its electricity to a 
“public utility”8 that will then resell the electricity to the final user 
where it is consumed. FERC exercises its authority over wholesale 
sales by approving the rate (the price of electricity) that a generator 
can charge when it sells its electricity to a public utility. 
The rationale behind FERC’s jurisdiction over wholesale sales of 
electricity is rooted in the theory that electricity is a part of interstate 
	
4 See Federal Power Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 201, 41 Stat. 1063 (2005) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 824). 
5 § 201(b)(1); TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 3, at 374. 
6 Federal Power Act § 201(d). 
7 Congress established the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in 1920 to oversee 
federally-controlled hydroelectric projects. History of FERC, FED. ENERGY REG. 
COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/students/ferc/history.asp (last visited July 13, 2013). 
Over time, the FPC’s scope of authority greatly expanded, and in 1977, the agency was 
renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 3, 
at 380. Today, FERC is the federal agency that is responsible for regulating both 
transmission and wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce, regulating the 
transmission and wholesale sales of natural gas and oil in interstate commerce, issuing 
licenses for hydroelectric projects, monitoring and investigating energy markets, and 
performing many more regulatory functions. What FERC Does, FED. ENERGY REG. 
COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last updated May 28, 2013). 
8 It is important to note that the meaning of a “public utility” is specifically defined in 
the FPA and is not the same as “electric utilities” or “transmitting utilities” as defined in 
the FPA. Federal Power Act §§ 3(22)–(23), 201(e). Moreover, when talking about energy 
law, many people use the term “public utility” inconsistently to refer to a host of different 
things. For example, the term “public utility” is most appropriately used in reference to 
consumer-owned utilities that are nonprofit organizations operated on behalf of customers, 
such as People’s Utility Districts, Municipal Utilities, and Electric Co-operatives. 
Oregon’s PUDs: Differences Between Public and Private Utilities, OR. PEOPLE’S UTIL. D. 
ASS’N, http://opuda.org/oregons-puds/ (last visited July 28, 2013). However, “public 
utility” is also sometimes used to refer to a private, Investor-Owned Utility (IOU) given 
that the “public” can buy shares of stock in the company and therefore it is “publically 
held.” IOUs, however, are businesses in the electric industry charged with the purpose of 
making a profit for owners and shareholders, so it is quite misleading to call an IOU a 
“public utility.” Id. 
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commerce. The premise is that because the physical nature of 
electricity is the same regardless of the source that generated it (just a 
bunch of indistinguishable electrons), once the electricity is sent into 
one of the major power grids that span multiple states,9 there is no 
way to know whether an electron produced in one state ended up 
being used within that state or whether it traveled across state lines 
through the grid and was consumed in another state. Thus, interstate 
commerce is invoked when electricity enters an interstate grid and 
FERC maintains sole authority over the wholesale sale of that 
electricity.10 
Although states do not have authority over wholesale sales, they do 
have the power to regulate retail sales of electricity.11 A retail sale of 
electricity is a sale of electricity to the end user;12 for example, to a 
customer in his or her home where the electricity is consumed and 
cannot be resold. However, the problem that results from this split in 
federal and state authority over electricity sales is that states lack the 
power to set the rate for electricity from renewable generators. For 
example, say that a renewable generator in a state produces electricity 
from a clean, renewable resource and wants to sell it. FERC, a federal 
agency, holds the authority to approve the rate at which the renewable 
generator can sell its electricity to a utility; the state has no say about 
the rate because it is restricted by the FPA. Moreover, because the 
federal government does not have a renewable energy policy in place, 
	
9 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE 
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE 13–14 (2000) [hereinafter EIA, 
CHANGING STRUCTURE], available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/archive/056200.pdf 
(there are three major power grids in the United States, the Eastern Interconnect, the 
Western Interconnect, and the Texas Interconnect; however, the Texas interconnect is not 
connected with the other two networks and is contained solely within the state of Texas). 
10 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964). The City of 
Colton, California, met its entire electric power need by purchasing electricity from 
Southern California Edison Company, a California company that only sold electricity in 
California. Id. at 206. The California Public Utilities Commission (the state regulatory 
agency) had been asserting jurisdiction over the Edison-Colton sale for many years. Id. 
However, the FPC stepped in and asserted jurisdiction over the sale, claiming that it was 
indeed a wholesale sale of electricity in interstate commerce because some of the 
electricity that Edison sold to Colton was generated out-of-state at the Hoover Dam. Id. at 
207–08. The Supreme Court held that the FPC properly asserted jurisdiction over the 
Edison-Colton sale, and it clarified that section 201(b) of the FPA grants plenary 
jurisdiction to the FPC over all wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce that 
are not expressly exempted by the Act. Id. at 217. 
11 TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 3, at 370. 
12 Electricity Terms and Definitions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/glossary.html#qr (last visited July 13, 2013). 
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FERC does not have to take any action to encourage utilities to 
purchase electricity generated from renewable resources. So naturally, 
the utility will not buy from a more expensive renewable generator on 
its own volition; instead, it will purchase electricity from the cheapest 
source, which is oftentimes also the dirtiest. 
In sum, the FPA’s grant of federal authority over wholesale sales 
of electricity severely limits a state’s ability to decide which sources 
will supply its electricity because a state cannot set the rate that a 
generator will receive for its electricity. However, it is important to 
note that there are at least a few exceptions to the FPA rule regarding 
jurisdiction over wholesale sales that are not discussed in this 
Comment.13 It was not until almost sixty years after the passage of the 
FPA that federal preemption began to subside as Congress instructed 
FERC to encourage renewable generation and FERC obliged, 
allowing states more leeway to affect wholesale sales of electricity. 
B. PURPA Carves Out an Exception to FPA Preemption 
In 1978, Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act as one of five statutes passed into law under the National Energy 
Act, which aimed to encourage the development of renewable 
energy.14 Congress planned to use section 210 of PURPA to achieve 
this goal by requiring electric utilities to interconnect with and 
purchase electricity from qualifying facilities made up of small power 
producers and cogenerators.15 A small power producer is defined as 
“a facility which is an eligible solar, wind, waste, or geothermal 
facility” or “[a] biomass, waste, renewable resources, geothermal 
resources [facility], or any combination thereof . . . not greater than 80 
megawatts.”16 A cogeneration facility is “a facility which produces—
(i) electric energy, and (ii) steam or forms of useful energy (such as 
	
13 Federal Power Act § 201(b)(2), (f) (listing exceptions to FERC’s jurisdiction); 
JENNIFER GLEASON, ENVTL. LAW ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE, ADOPTING STATE FEED-IN 
TARIFF LAWS WITHOUT FEDERAL PREEMPTION 2–4 (2012), available at http://www.elaw 
.org/system/files/fed.preemption.feb_.29.2012.pdf (listing further exceptions to FERC’s 
jurisdiction, including lack of jurisdiction in Alaska, Hawaii, and Texas because the 
electric grids in these states do not cross state lines). 
14 EIA, CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 9, at 31. 
15 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 210(a) (2009) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 824a-3). 
16 Federal Power Act § 3(17)(A) (definitions for some of the terms in PURPA are found 
in section 3 of the FPA). 
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heat) which are used for industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling 
purposes” and meets additional requirements set by FERC.17 
The idea behind section 210 of PURPA was that small renewable 
generators, QFs, would readily spring up because they were 
guaranteed to find a buyer for their electricity given that PURPA 
required electric utilities to purchase electricity from QFs.18 But it 
was not that simple. The tricky part was deciding what price the 
electric utility should be required to pay the QF for its clean 
electricity. Congress decided that the rate a utility must pay a QF 
should not exceed “the incremental cost to the electric utility of 
alternative electric energy,”19 which is known in the energy world as 
the utility’s “avoided cost” rate.20 FERC, having been assigned the 
task of developing regulations to implement PURPA, chose to carve 
out a small area in which states could set wholesale rates without 
being preempted by the FPA. After establishing required guidelines 
for states to follow, FERC allowed states to develop the methodology 
used to calculate, and ultimately establish, a QF’s avoided cost rate.21 
However, there was one large caveat—the state-established rate for 
the QF’s electricity could not exceed the purchasing utility’s avoided 
cost rate.22 
Avoided costs are defined in the regulations implementing PURPA 
as “the incremental costs to an electric utility of electric energy or 
capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the qualifying 
facility or qualifying facilities, such utility would generate itself or 
purchase from another source.”23 Perhaps more clearly explained, 
avoided cost is the cost the utility would incur to produce its own 
electricity or to buy electricity from a different source, but instead, the 
utility will forgo those options and buy electricity from a QF—and 
will pay the QF this “avoided cost” rate. 
However, the requirement that a utility purchase electricity from a 
QF at the utility’s avoided cost rate is problematic for QFs. Because 
	
17 § 3(18)(A). 
18 EIA, CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 9, at 32. 
19 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act § 210(b). 
20 See EIA, CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 9, at 32. 
21 CAROLYN ELEFANT, REVIVING PURPA’S PURPOSE: THE LIMITS OF EXISTING STATE 
AVOIDED COST RATEMAKING METHODOLOGIES IN SUPPORTING ALTERNATIVE ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT AND A PROPOSED PATH FOR REFORM 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.recycled-energy.com/images/uploads/Reviving-PURPA.pdf. 
22 Id. 
23 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2012). 
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avoided cost is traditionally set at the lowest possible avoided cost to 
the utility,24 the avoided cost rate typically does not reflect the actual 
cost that the QF incurred to generate the electricity. (Remember that 
QFs are small power producers generating electricity from renewable 
sources, and the technology required by these facilities is generally 
more expensive than for traditional, carbon-heavy sources.25) Thus, a 
QF faces a double-edged sword under PURPA. On the one side, the 
QF is guaranteed that it will find a buyer for its electricity. But on the 
other side, the price the QF will be paid for its electricity is not based 
on the actual cost that the QF incurred to produce it. 
Tax incentives are one way that a QF can attempt to make up the 
difference between the cost of generating the electricity and the 
avoided cost it received for the electricity. However, the tax credit, or 
even a combination of credits, may not always cover the difference. 
Furthermore, some of the most attractive tax credits, like the Wind 
Energy Production Tax Credit (PTC), can make planning difficult 
because the credit is set to expire periodically.26 Although Congress 
regularly re-extends the PTC, the uncertainty surrounding its future 
availability prevents the wind industry from experiencing continuous 
stability and growth. On the other hand, during the five-year period 
that Congress did not allow the PTC to expire, “the wind industry 
experienced a period of consistent year-over-year growth.”27 Thus, 
the availability of tax credits is incredibly important to the 
profitability of QFs operating in an avoided cost system, as is plainly 
evidenced by the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s statement 
that “the PTC has significantly contributed to wind development in 
	
24 GLEASON, supra note 13, at 3. 
25 Renewable Energy Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov 
/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=renewable_home (last updated May 25, 2012). 
26 The PTC was originally enacted as part of the 1992 Energy Policy Act and applied to 
generation from tax-paying owners of new wind plants and eligible biomass power plants, 
but has since been expanded to include a wider variety of renewable sources. Wind Energy 
Tax Credit Set to Expire at the End of 2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 21, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8870. The credit is based on annual 
production of electricity and is currently valued at 2.2 cents per kilowatthour (2011 
dollars) of energy produced from eligible sources. Id. However, Congress allowed the PTC 
to expire three times between 1999 and 2004, and then proceeded to retroactively extend it 
after the expiration deadline had passed. Id. As a result, new wind installations reached 
high levels in the twelve-month periods preceding the expiration date as developers rushed 
to beat the expiration deadline, but then dropped off substantially the following year as 
developers waited to see if Congress would extend the credit again. Id. 
27 Id. 
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the United States by increasing the financial return on a wind energy 
investment.”28 
C. EPAct 2005 Takes the Punch Out of PURPA 
The legal framework of PURPA section 210, which increased 
renewable resource-based electricity generation from QFs, took a 
considerable hit with the passage of EPAct 2005. EPAct 2005 added 
section 210(m) to PURPA, which exempted utilities from their 
purchase obligation from QFs under certain circumstances. However, 
to fully understand the rationale behind the section 210(m) 
amendment, it is necessary to first be familiar with the history of 
electric power transmission and how transmission access has 
transitioned from a closed market to a relatively open one. 
1. Opening Up Transmission to Allow for a Competitive Market 
The structure of the electric power industry is based on the three 
basic functions of power supply: (1) generation, “the production of 
electric energy from other energy sources”; (2) transmission, “the 
delivery of electric energy over high-voltage lines from the power 
plants to the distribution areas”; and (3) distribution, “the local system 
of lower voltage lines, substations, and transformers which are used to 
deliver the electricity to end-use consumers.”29 Thus, the transmission 
system (or grid) is absolutely essential to the success of the electric 
power industry because it allows electricity generated at a power plant 
to reach consumers. However, despite this essential role, transmission 
historically did not have common carrier status.30 In other words, 
owners of transmission facilities were allowed to “price discriminate” 
by charging one generator more than another to use its privately-
owned transmission lines and thus exercise substantial control over 
the electricity market.31 By the 1990s, many alternative energy 
producers could not gain access to transmission, and it was clear that 
private ownership of transmission facilities presented a significant 
obstacle to an open and competitive electricity market.32 In 1992, 
	
28 Id. 
29 EIA, CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 9, at 9. 
30 TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 3, at 384. 
31 Id. at 384–85 (explaining that typically a transmission owner also owned generation 
facilities; thus, the transmission owner always favored itself or its affiliates and essentially 
prohibited other generators from entering the electricity market). 
32 Id. at 385–86. 
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Congress responded to this concern with the Energy Policy Act 
(EPAct), which gave FERC broad authority to order owners of 
transmission facilities to allow other generators to transmit wholesale 
power over the transmission lines.33 
FERC implemented the EPAct requirement through Order No. 888, 
which “require[d] public utilities that own or operate transmission 
facilities in interstate commerce to file open access non-
discriminatory transmission tariffs that contain minimum terms and 
conditions for non-discriminatory service.”34 Additionally, Order No. 
888 required transmission-owning utilities to “functionally unbundle” 
(i.e., financially separate) transmission service from generation 
service within the corporation in order to reduce the possibility of 
self-dealing.35 
Order No. 888 and subsequent Order No. 889 made great strides 
toward creating a competitive electricity market and resulted in the 
establishment of Independent System Operators (ISOs) that centrally 
manage and coordinate transmission across wide geographic 
regions.36 FERC formalized ISOs under the title of Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTOs)37 and encouraged, but did not 
require, transmission-owning utilities to join an RTO.38 An RTO is 
independent from all participants in the market (i.e., owners of 
generation and/or transmission facilities and the utilities purchasing 
electricity) and its job is to “insure that regional wholesale power 
markets operate efficiently, that all market participants are treated 
fairly, that all transmission customers have open access, and that the 
bulk power system is reliable.”39 Currently, ten ISOs/RTOs serve 
	
33 Id. at 387; Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 13201). 
34 TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 3, at 387–88. See Order No. 888, Promoting 
Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services 
by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting 
Utilities, 75 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,080 at P 4 (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter Order No. 888]. 
35 TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 3, at 388; Order No. 888, supra note 34, P 4. 
36 TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 3, at 389–90. 
37 Id. at 390. 
38 MATTHEW H. BROWN & RICHARD P. SEDANO, NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELECTRICITY 
POLICY, ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION: A PRIMER 5 (2004), available at http://energy.gov 
/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/primer.pdf. 
39 TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 3, at 396. RTOs can be either a non-profit operator 
called an ISO or a for-profit operator called a Transco. Id. at 392. However, all RTOs 
“must have: [i]ndependence from market participants, [r]egional scope of operations, 
[a]uthority to plan and expand, [and] [a]n ‘open architecture’ policy to allow structural 
modifications.” Id. Additionally, RTOs must have sufficient capacity, provide reliable 
service, manage congestion, not discriminate, and offer reasonable prices. Id. at 396. A 
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two-thirds of the U.S. population and over half of the Canadian 
population.40 
2. Modification of Purchase Obligation from QFs 
In October 2006, FERC issued Order No. 688, which amended its 
regulations to reflect the changes made to PURPA under EPAct 
2005.41 EPAct 2005 added section 210(m) to PURPA, which 
terminated the requirement that electric utilities must purchase the 
electricity generated by QFs, so long as the QF has nondiscriminatory 
access to one of three kinds of wholesale markets.42 The QF must 
have access to (1) “independently administered, auction-based day 
ahead and real time wholesale markets” and “wholesale markets for 
long-term sales”;43 or (2) “(i) transmission and interconnection 
services that are provided by a Commission-approved regional 
transmission entity and administered pursuant to an open access 
transmission tariff that affords nondiscriminatory treatment to all 
customers; and (ii) competitive wholesale markets that provide a 
meaningful opportunity to sell . . . to buyers other than the utility to 
which the qualifying facility is interconnected”;44 or (3) wholesale 
markets that have a similar competitive quality as the markets 
described above.45 
Thus, FERC is tasked with determining (1) which actual markets 
meet the requirements of the markets listed above, and (2) whether 
the QF has non-discriminatory access to that market.46 If both factors 
	
primary job of an RTO is to match electricity generation to the load requirement 
instantaneously in order to keep the supply and demand for electricity in balance. 
ISO/RTO COUNCIL, THE VALUE OF INDEPENDENT REGIONAL GRID OPERATORS 7 (2005). 
The operators will forecast load requirements and then schedule sufficient generation to 
meet that load, and also ensure that back-up generation is available in case demand rises 
unexpectedly or a power plant goes offline. Id. RTOs also operate day-ahead and real-time 
spot markets for wholesale electricity, which give electricity suppliers more options to 
meet demand for power at the lowest possible cost. Id. 
40 TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 3, at 396. 
41 Order No. 688, New PURPA Section 210(m) Regulations Applicable to Small Power 
Production and Cogeneration Facilities, 117 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,078 at P 1 (Oct. 20, 2006) (to 
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 292) [hereinafter Order No. 688]. 
42 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 210(m)(1) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 824a-3). 
43 § 210(m)(1)(A). 
44 § 210(m)(1)(B). 
45 § 210(m)(1)(C). 
46 Order No. 688, supra note 41, P 1. 
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are met, then a utility does not have to continue to purchase electricity 
from a QF nor enter into a new contract with a QF once the current 
contract expires. Congress’s rationale for this rule is that as long as a 
QF has open access to the market, the mandatory purchase obligation 
is not necessary because the competitive market will stimulate QF 
development on its own.47 
PURPA section 210(m)(3) requires a utility seeking to be excused 
from its current purchase obligation to file an application with FERC 
that specifies how the QF that it is engaged with has access to one of 
the three types of wholesale markets.48 FERC has ninety days after 
the filing date to provide notice to the affected parties, provide an 
opportunity for comment, and decide whether to approve the 
application and relieve the purchasing utility of its obligation.49 If 
FERC approves a utility’s application, the affected QF, a state 
agency, and other affected parties have the opportunity to reinstate the 
purchase obligation if the conditions allowing the discharge change.50 
In Order No. 688, FERC also determined that four particular 
markets (Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. 
(Midwest ISO), PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), ISO New 
England, Inc. (ISO-NE), and the New York Independent System 
Operator (NYISO)) met section 210(m)’s requirements for wholesale 
markets.51 Additionally, FERC determined that QFs with net 
generation capacity over twenty megawatts have a rebuttable 
presumption of nondiscriminatory access to the four listed markets.52 
However, as mentioned previously, section 210(m)(3) requires 
utilities seeking relief from existing purchase obligations to file an 
application for relief with FERC (they are not automatically excused), 
and the affected QF has the opportunity to rebut the presumption of 
market access. But based on the provisions in section 210(m), most 
purchasing utilities will not have difficulty meeting the requirements 
for relief; thus, the opportunity to rebut the presumption does not 
provide much consolation for QFs. 
	
47 Id. P 6. 
48 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act § 210(m)(3). 
49 § 210(m)(3). 
50 § 210(m)(4). 
51 Order No. 688, supra note 41, P 8. 
52 Id. P 9(B); Major Qualifying Facility (QF) Orders, FED. ENERGY REG. 
COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/orders.asp (last 
updated Feb. 3, 2012). 
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3. Section 210(m) Hurts Renewable Generation 
The addition of section 210(m) to PURPA is detrimental to the 
goal of increasing the number of QFs entering the market and 
encouraging generation from a diversified mix of renewable sources. 
Removing the obligation to purchase a QF’s electricity takes the 
“teeth” out of PURPA section 210 because at this point in time there 
is no incentive for a utility to purchase electricity from a renewable 
generator in excess of the mandated purchase requirement in its 
state’s RPS.53 
The mandatory purchase requirement of QF-generated electricity 
was included in PURPA section 210 in order to give small renewable 
generators and cogeneration facilities a more level playing field in an 
electricity market that has long been dominated by traditional, fossil 
fuel-based generators. The rationale that a QF does not need the 
guaranteed purchase requirement if it has non-discriminatory access 
to wholesale markets is flawed. Even if a QF has unrestricted market 
access, what utility would choose to pay the higher price for 
electricity generated from renewable sources when the end product 
that they are purchasing—electricity—is the same? Unless the utility 
has a strong environmental conscience, it is unlikely to engage with 
QFs. The more likely scenario is that the utility will choose to build 
its own generation facility and employ the cheapest fuel source 
allowed under state law because investments in new generation earn 
the utility a rate of return. The result is a win-win situation for the 
utility—no requirement to purchase from QFs, and a higher rate of 
return for the utility—while the QF is left out in the cold. 
QFs over twenty megawatts that operate within an RTO or ISO 
have struggled to defeat the rebuttable presumption of market access 
when brought before FERC by their mandatory purchasing utility.54 
One QF succeeded in defeating the rebuttable presumption by 
presenting very specific facts about the operating characteristics of its 
facility that prevented it from participating in the RTO’s day-ahead 
and real-time energy markets without penalty.55 FERC accepted this 
	
53 Moreover, the utility only has to purchase the amount required by the state RPS if 
that RPS is binding and not simply “goals.” 
54 See Va. Elec. and Power Co., 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,045 (July 17, 2008). 
55 New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. & Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 
61,216 at P 8, 20 (Mar. 18, 2010). New York State Electric & Gas Corporation (NYSEG) 
and Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E) filed an application pursuant to 
section 210(m) of PURPA and section 292.310 of FERC’s regulations seeking to terminate 
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argument and found that the QF lacked nondiscriminatory access 
when its generation was contingent upon an intermittent source (i.e., 
steam from cogeneration) that made it impracticable to participate in 
day-ahead markets, and furthermore, if the QF did participate and 
failed to meet day-ahead commitments, it would be fined by the RTO, 
while other intermittent generators were exempt from the same fines 
and were also compensated for over-generation.56 
The lesson from this adjudication is that a successful rebuttal of a 
PURPA 210(m) challenge must be highly fact specific. Thus, a QF 
seeking to maintain its mandatory purchase status must demonstrate 
with specificity (1) the operating characteristics of its facility or 
energy source that prevent it from participating in the wholesale 
market, and (2) that it will be treated differently than other similar 
generators. Simply claiming a lack of access is not enough to 
overcome the presumption.57 Therefore, it is very important that a QF 
be able to explain its own operations in the context of the RTO’s 
market structure and market rules. 
	
the obligation to enter into new power purchase obligations or contracts with QFs over 
twenty megawatts situated within the New York Independent System Operator, Inc. 
(NYISO). Id. P 1, 4. Cornell University was one of the affected QFs. Id. P 7–8. Cornell 
owned and operated a forty megawatt cogeneration facility in Ithaca, New York and was a 
self-certified QF. Id. Cornell claimed that the operational characteristics of its 
cogeneration facility, namely its steam load that is dependent on weather conditions, made 
its excess electrical output highly variable and unpredictable on a daily basis. Id. Thus, 
Cornell was prevented from participating in the NYISO wholesale market because the 
NYISO Market Service Tariff imposed penalties for undergeneration on generators with 
variable loads. Id. Moreover, under the same tariff, intermittent generators such as wind, 
landfill gas, and solar were exempted from the penalties, therefore, Cornell did not have 
non-discriminatory access. Id. Based on the specificity of Cornell’s arguments, FERC 
concluded 
[w]hile certain intermittent resources such as wind and solar facilities are 
exempted from penalties for under-generation and compensated for over-
generation, this is not available to Cornell . . . . Given the high variability in its 
electric output due to its variable useful thermal output, and given that NYISO’s 
markets tie participation to power offered into the market the day before, in 
conjunction with penalties for under-generation and no compensation for over-
generation for QFs like Cornell, we conclude that Cornell is effectively denied 
nondiscriminatory access to NYISO’s markets. 
Id. P 20. 
56 Id. P 20. 
57 Id. P 21. 
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II 
HOW DOES A RENEWABLE GENERATOR SELL ITS ELECTRICITY AT 
WHOLESALE? 
This Part presents the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different approaches that renewable generators can take to sell the 
electricity they generate. The two primary approaches are to either 
obtain QF status or to gain market-based rate authority. 
A. Option One: Become a QF 
Despite some of the setbacks discussed above, there are still 
considerable benefits to being granted QF status by FERC; in 
particular, if the QF is less then twenty megawatts, then PURPA 
section 210(m)’s “rebuttable presumption” does not apply. The 
primary benefit of QF status is that QFs are exempt from complying 
with parts of the FPA, PURPA, and certain state laws that govern the 
rates and financial regulation of electric utilities.58 Hence, many 
renewable electricity generators seek QF status in order to take 
advantage of the favorable regulatory treatment. 
To become a QF, a facility must meet the QF requirements 
discussed in Part I Section B, which specified the sizes and sources 
that may qualify for QF status. Facilities with a maximum generation 
capacity of one megawatt or less are not required to file an application 
with FERC in order to claim QF status; however, they may seek 
Commission certification if they desire.59 
Owners of facilities that have a maximum generation capacity 
greater than one megawatt may attain QF status in one of two ways.60 
The first option is to become a self-certified QF. To do so, the facility 
owner or operator must submit a completed Form No. 55661 via 
	
58 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 210(e) (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3) (explaining that the exemption remains as long as it is 
needed to encourage cogeneration and small power production as determined by FERC). 
59 FERC Order No. 732 allows facilities with a maximum generation capacity of one 
megawatt or less to claim QF status without filing with the Commission. 18 C.F.R. § 
292.203(d)(1) (2012). 
60 How to Obtain QF Status for Your Facility, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/obtain.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 
2012). 
61 Form No. 556 is available to download from FERC’s website at http://www.ferc.gov 
/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/obtain.asp. 
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FERC’s eFiling system.62 Upon receipt of the form, FERC will issue 
a docket number so the applicant has a record of its filing and at this 
point the process is complete—the facility is a self-certified QF and 
will receive no further documentation from FERC.63 
The second option is to receive a Commission certification from 
FERC, which is often useful when carrying on negotiations for power 
purchase agreements. The applicant must complete a nineteen-page 
application that collects information about the location of the facility, 
the utilities that will transact with the facility, ownership and 
operation, sources used to generate electricity, the facility’s capacity, 
a certification of compliance with size limitations and fuel limitations, 
EPAct 2005 requirements, and information specific to cogeneration 
facilities.64 After eFiling a complete Form No. 556 and paying the 
accompanying filing fee, the applicant can use FERC’s online 
eLibrary to locate its docket number and application materials.65 
FERC will respond to the application within ninety days of filing to 
either grant or deny the application, or to toll the date required for 
issuing a decision on the application. However, if FERC has taken no 
action within ninety days of the original filing date or the date the 
application was amended (whichever is later), then the application is 
automatically granted and the applicant will be issued a Commission 
certification.66 
The last requirement for all filers, regardless of whether the 
applicant seeks self-certification or Commission certification, is to 
provide notice to all electric utilities that the facility plans to 
interconnect with, transmit, sell, or purchase electricity from; the 
state-level authority that will regulate the facility; and all of the 
utilities with which it will conduct business.67 The Commission is 
responsible for publishing a description of the filing in the Federal 
Register to provide notice to the public.68 
	
62 Self-Certification, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/industries 
/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/self-cert.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2012). 
63 Id. 
64 Application for Commission Certification, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/comm-cert.asp (last updated Feb. 
3, 2012). 
65 Self-Certification, supra note 62 (noting applicants can locate their information by 
performing a “New Dockets Search”). 
66 Application for Commission Certification, supra note 64. 
67 Notice Requirements, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov 
/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/notice.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2012). 
68 Id. 
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B. Option Two: Obtain Market-Based Rate Authority 
If a renewable electricity generator does not want to become a QF, 
or does not meet the specific requirements for QF status, then a 
second option for selling its electricity is to gain market-based rate 
authority from FERC. Market-based rate authority allows a seller that 
has been granted this authority to sell electricity into the wholesale 
market competitively, at a rate determined by the market, rather than 
restricting the seller to a cost-based rate.69 
A renewable generator may actually prefer market-based rate 
authority because it allows the generator to negotiate a power 
purchase agreement or standard contract that is based on the market 
price for the electricity and then lock that price into a long-term 
contract.70 Moreover, although the transaction between a generator 
with market-based rate authority (the seller) and a purchasing utility 
(the buyer) is indeed a wholesale sale of electricity that falls under 
FERC’s regulatory jurisdiction, FERC will assume that the rate 
agreed upon by the seller and purchaser is just and reasonable.71 
Thus, unless someone petitions, FERC will honor the contract that the 
parties entered into without reviewing it. If FERC does not grant a 
seller market-based rate authority, that seller can only sell electricity 
at cost-based rates that are reviewed by FERC according to traditional 
cost-based ratemaking guidelines.72 The downside to the market-
	
69 JAMES H. MCGREW, FERC: FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 194 (2d 
ed. 2009). 
70 See Avoided Costs (Incremental Costs), N.C. SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ASS’N, 
http://energync.org/assets/files/AvoidedCosts.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2013). 
71 This assumption is based on the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine. The Mobile-Sierra Doctrine 
is the result of two landmark Supreme Court cases addressing the issue of contractually 
established rates and the ability to change or adjust those rates. See MCGREW, supra note 
69, at 199–205. Neither the FPA nor the Natural Gas Act (NGA) specifies how FERC 
should regulate bilateral or multiparty contracts for ratemaking; the only guiding rule is 
that the rates must be “just and reasonable” (according to the FPA). Id. at 199. In 1956, the 
Supreme Court addressed this issue in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service 
Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956) and FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956). 
Together, the two cases created the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine, which provides that any 
freely-negotiated bilateral or multiparty contract for the wholesale sale of electricity is 
presumed to satisfy the FPA requirement of just and reasonableness. Id. at 201. However, 
if it can be shown that the contract threatens or harms the public interest, the presumption 
that the contract is just and reasonable is overcome, and FERC has the authority to review 
and revise it. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 
2756–57 (2008). Traditional grounds for invalidating a contract, such as fraud or duress, 
can also be used to contest the contract. Id. at 2746. 
72 MCGREW, supra note 69, at 194. 
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based approach is that the generator selling its electricity must comply 
with FPA requirements (QFs are exempt in many ways) and specific 
FERC reporting requirements. 
Additionally, gaining market-based rate authority can be a difficult 
hurdle for a renewable generator because of the criteria it must meet 
to gain approval from FERC.73 The concern about granting market-
based rate authority to sellers of electricity is based on the fact that 
electric utilities are monopolies with considerable power to abuse the 
market when left unregulated.74 In fact, Part II of the FPA was 
enacted specifically to curtail the problem of market-based rates that 
had gotten out of hand because wholesale electricity sales were 
unregulated.75 Essentially, unregulated electricity markets could not 
ensure that rates were “just and reasonable,” which is the standard for 
rates under the FPA.76 
Thus, historically, FERC would only grant market-based rate 
authority to sellers that were not vertically integrated (sellers that did 
not own both generation and transmission facilities) as a precaution to 
prevent monopolization and manipulation of the market.77 However, 
over time FERC changed its position and allowed vertically 
integrated sellers or power marketers affiliated with vertically 
integrated sellers to receive market-based rate authority as long as the 
seller or its affiliates did not have, or could mitigate, market power in 
generation and transmission and could not erect other barriers to 
entry.78 Additionally, the transmission provider was required to have 
an approved open-access transmission tariff on file with FERC.79 The 
open-access transmission tariff ensured that utilities that owned or 
controlled transmission lines would allow nondiscriminatory access to 
those transmission lines and would “provide service to third parties 
comparable to service provided for their own sales.”80 However, these 
	
73 Electric Market-Based Rates, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov 
/industries/electric/gen-info/mbr.asp (last updated Nov. 27, 2012). 
74 TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 3, at 39. 
75 MCGREW, supra note 69, at 193. 
76 Federal Power Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 205(a), 41 Stat. 1063 (2005) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 824). 
77 MCGREW, supra note 69, at 194–95. 
78 Id. at 195–96. These requirements are laid out in Heartland Energy Servs., Inc., et 
al., 68 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,223 (1994) and FERC Order No. 888. 
79 Id. at 196 (required in FERC Order No. 888). 
80 Id. at 258. A tariff is simply a “compilation, either in book form or on electronic 
media, of all the effective rate schedules of a regulated entity together with a copy of each 
form of service agreement.” Id. at 260. 
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regulations did not prove to be sufficient—market-based sellers were 
not following FERC’s reporting requirements and FERC drastically 
neglected its duties of monitoring and enforcement.81 
In response to serious manipulation of the electricity market, FERC 
reviewed its existing procedures, initiated rulemaking, solicited 
comments, and issued Order No. 697: Market-Based Rates for 
Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services 
By Public Utilities.82 Order No. 697 and 18 C.F.R. Part 35, Subpart H 
contain the current requirements that a seller must meet in order to be 
granted market-based rate authority.83 An applicant must establish 
that it and its affiliates meet the Commission’s standards for (1) 
horizontal market power and (2) vertical market power, in addition to 
proposing (3) a tariff containing all of the required provisions outlined 
by FERC.84 
A seller can meet the first two requirements by submitting a market 
power analysis that addresses whether or not it has horizontal and 
vertical market power.85 Horizontal market power is determined by 
two market power screens: “a pivotal supplier analysis based on the 
annual peak demand of the relevant market, and a market share 
analysis applied on a seasonal basis.”86 If the seller passes the two 
market power screen tests, there is a rebuttable presumption that the 
seller lacks horizontal market power; if the seller fails the screen tests, 
then there is a rebuttable presumption that the seller has horizontal 
market power, and the seller will need to successfully rebut the 
presumption to move forward in the application process.87 
Vertical market power is determined based on a seller or its 
affiliate’s control over transmission facilities and wholesale energy 
markets.88 If a seller or its affiliates “own, operate or control 
	
81 Id. at 196. “The Commission’s experimentation with market-based rates produced 
unintended consequences in the form of market manipulation, gaming practices, and 
outright fraud. The California energy crisis and the collapse of Enron are the most 
notorious examples of the failure of the market-based sales experiment.” Id. This result 
was compounded by FERC’s severe neglect of monitoring and enforcement. 
82 Id. at 197. 
83 How do I Get Authorization?: What do I Include in My Application? What 
Requirements Apply?, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/industries 
/electric/gen-info/mbr/authorization/app.asp (last updated Nov. 27, 2012).  
84 18 C.F.R. § 35.37 (2012). 
85 § 35.37. 
86 § 35.37(c)(1). 
87 § 35.37(c)(1)–(3). 
88 § 35.37(d). 
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transmission facilities, [then they] must have on file with the 
Commission an Open Access Transmission Tariff.”89 Additionally, 
the seller must show that it lacks ownership or control over inputs to 
electric power production, such as interstate natural gas 
transportation, coal supply, and sites it plans to develop for electricity 
generation.90 The seller must include this information in the 
application and also affirm that it has not, and will not, erect barriers 
to the relevant market.91 
The third part of the application process is the seller’s proposed 
tariff. Section 205 of the FPA requires a seller seeking market-based 
rate authority to file an application with FERC.92 FERC requires that 
the application be submitted online using its electronic eTariff 
system.93 The applicant must register using FERC’s website, follow 
the instructions on the website, and assemble the rest of the 
application, which includes a proposed market-based rate tariff.94 The 
application includes a transmittal letter; contact information; a 
description of the kinds of services offered; a description of the 
applicant’s and its affiliates’ business activities; an explanation of 
how the applicant satisfies the vertical and horizontal market power 
screens; a request to be designated as either a Category 1 or Category 
2 Seller and an accompanying explanation of how it meets the 
requirements of the desired category (18 C.F.R. § 35.36(a)); requests 
for waivers or authorizations; an eTariff meeting the requirements of 
Order No. 697 and No. 697-A; and a two-part appendix of all 
generation or transmission assets, natural gas intrastate pipelines, and 
gas storage facilities owned or controlled by the applicant.95 Some of 
these requirements are discussed in depth below. 
A required component of the application is to determine if the 
seller is a Category 1 Seller or a Category 2 Seller. A seller is defined 
as “any person that has authorization to . . . engage in sales for resale 
of electric energy, capacity or ancillary services at market-based rates 
	
89 § 35.37(d) (§ 35.28 describes the Open Access Transmission Tariff). 
90 § 35.37(e). 
91 § 35.37(e). 
92 How do I Get Authorization?: What do I Include in My Application? What 
Requirements Apply?, supra note 83. 
93 Id. 
94 Id.; How do I Get Authorization?: Step by Step Guide to Filing Your Application in 
the eTariff System, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSON, http://www.ferc.gov/industries 
/electric/gen-info/mbr/authorization/guide.asp (last updated Aug. 7, 2013). 
95 How do I Get Authorization?: Step by Step Guide, supra note 94. 
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under section 205 of the Federal Power Act.”96 Category 1 Sellers are 
defined as “wholesale power marketers and wholesale power 
producers that own or control 500 megawatts or less of generation in 
aggregate per region; that do not own, operate or control transmission 
facilities other than limited equipment necessary to connect individual 
generating facilities to the transmission grid.”97 Additionally, 
Category 1 Sellers cannot be affiliated with others who might pose 
vertical market power issues, such as someone who owns or controls 
transmission in the same region that the seller generates electricity in, 
or a franchised public utility in the same region.98 Category 2 Sellers 
are defined as “any Sellers not in Category 1.”99 
Additionally, the seller must propose a market-based rate tariff that 
will govern its wholesale sales at market-based rates if FERC should 
approve the application. FERC provides a sample tariff on its 
webpage. The sample begins with a clause listing the availability of 
the seller’s electricity for purchase and a clause stating that the rates 
shall be established by agreement between the seller and the 
purchaser.100 However, the tariff must contain specific requirements 
to be considered by FERC: (1) the proposed tariff must contain two 
provisions copied without modification from FERC’s example101 that 
assure compliance with FERC regulations and list limitations on a 
seller’s market-based rate authority, (2) the seller must list whether it 
is a Category 1 or Category 2 Seller for every region in which it 
operates,102 and (3) each tariff must be submitted through the eTariff 
system.103 The Commission also requires the inclusion of additional 
unmodified provisions in the eTariff if they apply to the particular 
	
96 18 C.F.R. § 35.36(a)(1) (2012). 
97 § 35.36(a)(2). 
98 Id. 
99 § 35.36(a)(3). 
100 Market-Based Rate Tariff, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSON, http://www.ferc.gov 
/industries/electric/gen-info/mbr/tariff.asp (last updated Nov. 27, 2012). 
101 Order No. 697, Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, 
Capacity and Ancillary Services By Public Utilities, 119 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,295 at P 915-916 
(June 21, 2007) (requiring the inclusion of two provisions, which can be found on FERC’s 
website. See How Do I Get Authorization?: Ancillary Services and Required Tariff 
Provisions, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-
info/mbr/authorization/provision.asp (last updated Aug. 27, 2013). 
102 Order No. 697-A, Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, 
Capacity and Ancillary Services By Public Utilities, 123 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,055 at P 391 (Apr. 
21, 2008). 
103 Order No. 714, Electronic Tariff Filings, 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,270 (Sept. 19, 2008). 
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seller.104 Whether the seller falls under Category 1 or Category 2 
affects the schedule of the future monitoring process by FERC. FERC 
reviews sellers in each of its six regions every three years, known as 
the “Triennial Reviews.” FERC requires all Category 2 Sellers that 
have achieved market-based rate authority to file a market power 
analysis for the particular region that they operate in based on the 
regional review schedule outlined in Order No. 697-A.105 
III 
STATES HAVE THE POWER TO MOVE FROM AVOIDED COSTS TO 
FEED-IN TARIFFS 
The previous two Parts explained the federal regulation of 
wholesale sales of electricity and the preemption obstacle states 
encounter, as well as the two different routes a renewable generator 
can take to sell its electricity. This final Part discuss two very 
important FERC Orders that chipped away at federal preemption and 
revealed a legal solution that increases a state’s ability to affect the 
avoided cost for renewables. Specifically, FERC’s October 21, 2010 
Order clarified that if a state requires utilities to obtain electricity 
from a very specific set of sources, then the state can set the avoided 
cost for each source at the lowest cost to obtain that specific source. 
In other words, with careful construction of a renewable energy 
mandate (or binding RPS), a state can essentially create a feed-in 
tariff for the renewable sources that they require. Below is a detailed 
explanation of how a state can leap from a standard avoided cost 
calculation to the ability to structure a feed-in tariff for renewable 
sources. 
A. The California Public Utilities Commission Tests Its Boundaries 
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) tested the 
boundaries of its authority to affect wholesale sales when it 
implemented Assembly Bill 1613 (AB 1613) which “amended the 
California Public Utilities Code to require ‘electrical corporations’ in 
California . . . to offer to purchase, at a price to be set by the CPUC, 
electricity that is generated by certain CHP generators and delivered 
	
104 The eight additional provisions that may apply, depending on the seller, can be 
found on FERC’s website. See How do I Get Authorization?: Step by Step Guide, supra 
note 94. 
105 Triennial Reviews–When to File, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSON, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/mbr/triennial/when.asp (last updated Nov. 
27, 2012). 
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to the grid.”106 The CHP generators referred to in AB 1613 are 
combined heat and power generators (known as “cogenerators” under 
PURPA) that do not generate over twenty megawatts of electricity 
and must meet specific efficiency and emission standards set by the 
CPUC.107 Some of the large utilities affected by this decision (later 
referred to as the “Joint Utilities”), including Southern California 
Edison Company, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and San Diego 
Gas & Electric Company, did not like the CPUC’s implementation of 
AB 1613 and petitioned FERC, claiming that the CPUC did not have 
the authority to set wholesale rates for CHP generators because it is 
preempted by the FPA.108 The CPUC then requested that FERC find 
that the decision to “require California utilities to offer a certain price 
to combined heat and power (CHP) generating facilities of twenty 
megawatts or less that meet energy efficiency and environmental 
compliance requirements” is not preempted by the FPA, PURPA, or 
FERC regulations.109 
FERC issued a response to the CPUC’s request in its July 15, 2010 
Order110 concluding that “a state commission may, pursuant to 
PURPA, determine avoided cost rates for qualifying facilities”111 and: 
 [T]he CPUC’s AB 1613 feed-in tariff would not be preempted 
by the FPA, PURPA, or Commission’s regulations as long as: (1) 
the CHP generators from which the CPUC is requiring the Joint 
Utilities to purchase energy and capacity are QFs pursuant to 
PURPA; and (2) the rate established by the CPUC does not exceed 
the avoided cost of the purchasing utility.112 
Based on this language, the July 15, 2010 Order was only a partial 
victory for the CPUC because, although FERC said the CPUC could 
proceed with its new CHP program as long as it was implemented 
within the bounds of PURPA, the rate established by the CPUC for 
CHP electricity could still not exceed the avoided cost of the 
purchasing utility. In October 2010, the CPUC asked FERC for 
	
106 Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 133 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,059 at P 4 (Oct. 21, 2010) (citing 
CPUC May 4, 2010 Petition at 2–3). 
107 See id. P 3. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. CPUC asked FERC to rule that § 205 and § 206 of the FPA and § 210 of PURPA 
did not preempt the CPUC’s AB 1613. 
110 Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,047 (July 15, 2010). 
111 Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, supra note 106, P 5. 
112 Id. 
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clarification. FERC handed down its October 21, 2010 Order, which 
proved to be a huge victory for states and renewables. 
B. FERC’s October 21, 2010 Order 
In FERC’s October 21, 2010 Order, the CPUC requested 
clarification on its authority to set avoided cost, specifically 
pertaining to its own assertions that: 
(1) the CPUC can require retail utilities to consider different factors 
in the avoided cost calculation in order to promote development of 
more efficient CHP facilities; and (2) “full avoided cost” need not 
be the lowest possible avoided cost and can properly take into 
account real limitations on “alternate” sources of energy imposed 
by state law.113 
The CPUC claimed that PURPA’s stated purposes of “increas[ing] 
the use of cogeneration and small power production facilities and to 
reduce reliance on fossil fuels”114 was consistent with its argument to 
offer a higher avoided cost rate to more efficient generators. 
FERC agreed with the CPUC, stating, “the concept of a multi-
tiered avoided cost rate structure can be consistent with the avoided 
cost rate requirements set forth in PURPA and in our regulations.”115 
Moreover, “where a state requires a utility to procure a certain 
percentage of energy from generators with certain characteristics, 
generators with those characteristics constitute the sources that are 
relevant to the determination of the utility’s avoided cost for that 
procurement requirement.”116 This language is incredibly 
empowering for states. It means that if a state mandates that a utility 
purchase electricity from a specific renewable source, then the 
avoided cost that the utility has to pay can be set at the lowest cost of 
obtaining that specific renewable source.117 In other words, the 
renewable generator will actually get paid a rate that covers the cost 
of generating the electricity! For example, in terms of the CPUC’s 
CHP program, if the state mandates that Utility A purchase twenty 
percent of its electricity from CHP facilities that generate twenty 
megawatts or less and meet specific energy efficiency and compliance 
requirements, then the state can set avoided cost at the lowest cost to 
generate electricity meeting all of those specific characteristics. 
	
113 Id. P 7. 
114 Id. P 13. 
115 Id. P 26. 
116 Id. P 27, 29. 
117 See id. P 29, 31. 
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FERC’s October 21, 2010 Order allows states to greatly expand 
their base of renewable sources as long as they provide specific 
requirements detailing the mix of renewables that must make up the 
state’s energy base in the form of a detailed RPS or other mandate. As 
a result, utilities are prevented from continuing to only purchase the 
cheapest renewable sources (or none at all, depending on the state’s 
RPS requirements). This is an incredibly important shift because it 
gets other renewables that may be more expensive onto the grid, 
which will drive down their cost and allow a more diverse mix of 
renewables to fulfill our energy needs. 
C. FERC’s January 20, 2011 Order 
The Joint Utilities were not happy with the October 21, 2010 Order 
because it affirmed that states do in fact have the authority under 
PURPA to require utilities to purchase renewable energy required by 
their RPS at the actual cost of producing that energy, so they 
requested a rehearing. FERC denied the request for a rehearing in its 
January 20, 2011 Order, ruling boldly in favor of state authority to set 
rates for renewables by affirming that “states have the authority to 
dictate the generation resources from which utilities may procure 
electric energy”118 and “[a]s explained in the Clarification Order, 
where a state requires a utility to procure energy from generators with 
certain characteristics, generators with those characteristics constitute 
the sources that are relevant to the determination of the utility’s 
avoided cost for that procurement requirement.”119 
D. Feed-In Tariffs Under PURPA 
FERC’s October 21, 2010 Order and January 20, 2011 Order are 
major victories for state action on renewables because they have 
essentially opened the door for states to design feed-in tariffs for 
renewable sources. Currently, there is no officially recognized 
definition of a feed-in tariff, but feed-in tariffs typically require a 
utility to purchase electricity (generated from renewable sources) at a 
rate that covers the cost of generation, or even better, allows the 
renewable generator to make a profit and enter into a long-term 
	
118 Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 134 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,044 at P 30 (Jan. 20, 2011). 
119 Id. 
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contract.120 The National Renewable Energy Laboratory provides a 
working definition of a feed-in tariff as a program “which obligates 
an electric distribution utility to purchase electricity from an eligible 
renewable energy seller at specified prices (set sufficiently high to 
attract to the state the types and quantities of renewable energy 
desired by the state) for a specified duration.”121 
The next question when designing a feed-in tariff is, which pricing 
model will achieve the desired results? There are several options, 
including a “cost-based” model, where the generator recovers the cost 
of generation and a reasonable profit; a “market-based” model, where 
the price is decided after examining competing prices among similar 
operations; and a “value-based” model, where the value placed by 
citizens on the benefits of a cleaner environment or a diverse source 
of generation is reflected in the price of the electricity.122 
CONCLUSION 
For decades the Federal Power Act severely limited a state’s ability 
to increase the percentage of electricity in the market generated from 
renewable sources. Although the passage of PURPA section 210 
greatly aided renewable generators by requiring utilities to purchase 
QF-generated electricity, the avoided cost provision of the Act failed 
to compensate the renewable generator for the full cost of producing 
its clean electricity. Additionally, EPAct 2005 blunted PURPA’s 
effectiveness. Despite these continued setbacks, a state’s ability to 
influence the wholesale price for renewable energy grew by leaps and 
bounds with the October 21, 2010 and January 20, 2011 FERC 
Orders, which clarified that states can legally design feed-in tariffs for 
renewable sources within the bounds of PURPA. 
As a result of these FERC decisions, states across the country 
should feel empowered to create “tiered-systems” where separate 
avoided costs for each type of renewable source in the tier can be 
established. To achieve this, states must be incredibly diligent about 
designing mandates for renewables (either through an RPS or other 
mandate) that clearly indicate the specific quantity and kind of 
renewables, along with any desired characteristics, that a utility must 
	
120 SCOTT HEMPLING ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE ENERGY 
PRICES IN STATE-LEVEL FEED-IN TARIFFS: FEDERAL LAW CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS iv (2010). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 44. Disagreement exists as to whether the three models proposed are all “true” 
feed-in tariffs. The cost-based model is the most widely accepted approach. 
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purchase. States should take advantage of this creative solution 
because it does not require any changes to current law.123 But much 
of the momentum lies in the hands of state legislatures to carefully 
design tiered-systems and pass them into law. The legal solution for 
increasing and diversifying the amount of electricity generated from 
clean, renewable resources lies waiting. Now is the time to act. 
  
	
123 This Comment advocates for the use of feed-in tariffs within the bounds of PURPA; 
however, other routes exist to achieve the same goal. Three other potential routes include: 
(1) developing the REC system; (2) lobbying Congress for a legislative amendment to the 
FPA; and (3) lobbying FERC to amend avoided cost factors. 
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